@cold_and_quiet@emmma_camp_ If this were the "substance" wouldn't the straightforward policy just be "ban big government political parties and imprison their leaders" as opposed to trying to back your way into small gov by removing the franchise from groups you think are likely to support those parties
@auroter This is flatly not the case for brainstorming, problem solving, red teaming etc in law. The commercially available frontier models only became useable for this ~6-9 months ago imo.
@soblackandblue@xwanyex That same issue included an entire feature about how being struck by lightning changes your psychology. I genuinely do not believe that either abolition of universal suffrage nor being-struck-by-lightning-ism are material parts of our political discourse.
@soblackandblue@xwanyex actually a large part of modern political discourse does *not* consist of meta conversations over why a conversation is happening, let alone specifically a first order conversation about universal suffrage
@xwanyex yes I don't think you have actually said anything at all. "X social phenomenon makes it more likely that Y conversations will happen" is just vacuous.
@MN_Vikings_Pete@AngryVorosM@DrZersetzung Maybe this is a professional culture difference. In my context—law—decisiveness is not unimportant (it's valuable bc of its scarcity in fact) but *posturing* around ambiguity is dangerous and bad and wont get a candidate a callback from me.
@elendarulianreo@memeticsisyphus I mean my read is that *really* what he was doing was making a quixotic self-defense argument to satisfy his client while actually working hard to try to get a verdict for manslaughter rather than murder
@MN_Vikings_Pete@AngryVorosM@DrZersetzung But neither your answer—nor the polar opposite answer in this thread you liked—are insightful either. They're *decisive* but both obviously a bit of insincere absolutist posturing. I don't understand what signal you get by finding out if an interviewee will do that posturing.
@SpaceElevator7@AlecStapp@tylercowen I was required to do this, on one occasion, in LRW in 2012. I thought it was a useful exercise, in part bc WL still uses lots of metaphors ported over wholesale from the hard copy tech.
@alegator_cs@tdietterich@Endothermia If half a scientific paper contains sexually explicit fiction about goblins rather than mathematics, I will probably not read the other half, because I will make reasonable assumptions about its utility
@basedganyu@punished_bobda "the hypothetical is so remote as to not be useful in moral reasoning" > "the hypothetical is nonsensical and actually has no content because it contains an implicit contradiction"
@basedganyu@punished_bobda This is a much better framing but plenty of people are making the argument at the level of, essentially, the formal semantics of counterfactual hypotheticals.
@PalmyrPar@justalexoki@dyingscribe The problem is that people are grounding the disagreement in like, the formal semantics of which counterfactual hypotheticals are intelligible. Instead of just saying "this counterfactual is sufficiently remote that it is not useful for moral reasoning".
@Enkwelos@BrandonTheAdams@fleshofgrass@SyntheticAnima if you're just a hard determinist, are there any counterfactual hyptheticals that have semantic meaning for you? If so, how do you explain their intelligibility, given that necessarily nothing could ever have been other than it is?
@blightersort@webdevMason like eriksen's claim isn't just "this hypothetical is not particularly meaningful or useful for reasoning about justice and moral desert" it is "this hypothetical is nonsense"
@blightersort@webdevMason so then why instead of having this question in a moral-ethical register—and there's 50+ yrs of people arguing w Rawls in that register—are we doing all this shadowboxing about the formal semantic content of certain kinds of counterfactual hypotheticals?