By reintroducing US theater nuclear forces to East Asia—first in South Korea, and then more gradually in Japan — Washington can reassure its anxious allies, while also bolstering its own national security interests, writes AEI’s @BalzerKyle https://t.co/Xcjxu1nTwX
The US is embarking upon a significant military buildup, with increased funding for shipbuilding, missile production, and Golden Dome. What should not be lost in the shuffle, though, is the need to redeploy nuclear forces to the Western Pacific.
Read more by @BalzerKyle:
https://t.co/nQV8i0EB7o
My latest on extended deterrence in East Asia, w/ @RealBobPeters
Deterrence by denial isn't enough in East Asia. The US needs broader theater nuclear response options to reassure anxious allies and convince Xi he won't be able to escalate his way out of failing conventional war
An honor to welcome back @schoolofwarpod the brilliant Nicholas Eberstadt, this time talking about his work not just on China's demographic cliff--but also America's looming population decline, and what urgently needs to be done.
https://t.co/og36aeHDRz
Noting that Admiral Paparo @INDOPACOM favors buying 200 B-21 bombers, @SenatorRounds asks whether the Pentagon should revisit the requirement of 100 Raiders to match the global threat?
Sec. Hegseth tells the Senate the U.S. military will require a "lot more" B-21s, definitely "over 100."
After combing through the budget documents released so far, it looks like the increase in Space Force funding is enduring. While the service was highly dependent on reconciliation funding in FY26, and somewhat less dependent in FY27, the increases are largely sustained in the base budget in FY28 and beyond. This puts the Space Force on more stable footing. This is good news for the Space Force.
@NicholasACarl and I are attempting to assess the progress + challenges of the US campaign by using US airpower theory + doctrine to assess the campaign on its own terms.
There are military successes, but the ultimate evaluation must be based on political outcomes and whether those support US interests.
Since the start of President Trump's 2nd term, he has ousted 21 flag or general officers. Amidst concern about the administration politicizing the military, it's important to evaluate the qualifications of replacements.
Which is why, AEI's @KoriSchake and Caleb Dixon recently released their Military Ouster and Replacement Tracker.
https://t.co/kP3IFtT1DU
The world is currently mired in nuclear-induced instability in the Middle East. Yet an even greater nuclear shock looms in the Pacific, should the US fail to adjust its diplomatic and military posture after the Iran war ends.
My latest:
https://t.co/uMLpTP11uO
Special Edition China-Taiwan Update: @FredWKagan and @DAlexBlumenthal analyze the PLA's ability to adapt to modern warfare and what they may be observing from conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Read more here:
https://t.co/6Rl2FpybQx
The world is currently mired in nuclear-induced instability in the Middle East. Yet an even greater nuclear shock looms in the Pacific, should the US fail to adjust its diplomatic and military posture after the Iran war ends.
My latest:
https://t.co/uMLpTP11uO
Pleased to share my thoughts with WOTR on the Iran war and its implications for nuclear spread. In the war's aftermath, Washington will have to redouble its nuclear and conventional efforts in the Pacific to strengthen nonproliferation.
https://t.co/IylX0V7lMA
Our adversaries are inclined to tunnel and take valued assets underground. A true earth-penetrating US nuclear capability might therefore bolster deterrence and spur less-threatening adversary behavior.
My latest, why the RNEP deserves another look:
https://t.co/D2M4P9x7AZ
This isn’t an isolated incident—it’s another data point in a long-running pattern of cooperation among Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
For the full picture of how deep and coordinated this alignment really is, check out AEI’s Axis of Aggression.
My latest examines the role of hedging in Cold War nuclear-force planning.
The shortcomings of McNamara in the 1960s and the farsightedness of Schlesinger and Brown in the 1970s offers some general ways to think about long-term planning today.