Asst Prof, Nazarbayev U Graduate School of Business. EconPhD Columbia. Trade Policy, Trade Law, Political Economy, Global Economic Governance. Views are my own.
This brilliant defense of the WTO by @ChadBown and @PhilipILevy notes that "the WTO's achievements have been substantially more modest" on subsidies. My co-authored 2017 @JIntlEcon paper on how politics influences initiation of WTO disputes also sheds light on why. #econtwitter
America has some reasonable trade complaints about China. Unfortunately, Trump had to learn the hard way that his go-it-alone approach toward Beijing would not work.
Why the United States now needs to run toward the WTO.
My latest, with @PhilipILevy
https://t.co/Kn1i0lrwen
@ALashkaripour Amazing work. Do you know how the shift from 2015 to 2020 applied tariffs affected share of excess profits for U.S. and for China? I'd suspect the U.S. had higher excess profit gains than ToT gains in tariffed sectors, but higher input costs impaired excess profits overall.
@Brad_Setser What about p. 14? Yes, the Senate reports three measures of balance of payments. But the table also clearly classifies measures of the trade balance as distinct from measures of the balance of payments, supporting that the White House Sec. 122 proclamation is misconstrued.
I find Phil’s evidence and arguments compelling. The 122 tariff proposal originated during a transitional period when it was not certain that the dollar would soon float for good; and the subsequent legislative process made a law of what had since become a vestige.
@petereharrell True that Sec. 301 matters more in short run. But Sec. 122 BoP deficit definitions are a new front for economists, defending principles taught in intro courses. The lack of any process, and potential for trade policy uncertainty, is also a more objectionable feature of Sec. 122.
@Brad_Setser This thread is useful. The White House would be on firmer legal ground if they used any 1975 NY Fed BoP definition & determined it "large and severe." But your implicit logic is MANY BoP definitions imply ANY is ok—not so. Definitions the WH did proclaim are clearly misconstrued.
@petereharrell@BenMcCombe@Brad_Setser Post-Loper Bright the key legal question is original meaning of BoP deficits in the 1974 law, not what economists think today, nor CIT dicta. The case for clear misconstruction is strong: the White House Sec. 122 Proclamation states that two cookies with no cream make an Oreo.
@petereharrell Honest Q: If courts must defer to POTUS determination that trade deficits are BoP deficits in Sec 122, why didn't they also have to defer to POTUS determination that taxes are regulations in IEEPA?
@Brad_Setser While you make persuasive arguments to remedy the US current account deficit and deteriorating net IIP, these concerns are transparently not in the scope of crises Congress intended for Section 122 tariffs; they are not BoP deficits based on ordinary meaning in 1974.
CRS: "In 1974, the year Congress passed Section 122, the Senate Finance Committee reported that “under present circumstances [Section 122] authority is not likely to be utilized,” possibly referring to the recent collapse of the Bretton Woods system." https://t.co/ZAz3vB0zs5
@petereharrell@michaelnorth Clear to you, but many argued IEEPA was an uphill battle too because courts won't 2nd-guess President's determination of an emergency, ignoring they can rule that tariffs are not regulations. Courts can also rule that WH 122 tariffs are citing deficits that are not BoP deficits.
@ATabarrok@jbsteinberg Probably King John in 1215 — These barons still permit me to command their due knight service, yet they now require common counsel to impose the tiniest scutage!!
@theopekepe @snlester Section 122 was a reaction to Nixon tariffs in 1971. It defined exactly under what conditions tariffs could be used to address a BoP crisis. The law was still relevant in 1974 because it was not obvious that free-floating the dollar in 1973 would be successful policy long-term.
@IlyaSomin@AlisonSomin Can new Section 122 tariffs face a Major Questions Doctrine challenge, since the deficit in the current account (or its components) and a deterioration in the net IIP cited by the White House are not balance-of-payments deficits and haven't been interpreted as such in 52 years?
@arindube@mattyglesias In the two decades post-NAFTA when Democrats allegedly abandoned the working class, Democrat voting was more protectionist relative to Republicans than at any point in American history. Figure is from @D_A_Irwin https://t.co/xdwHXuhqFj
@JustinWolfers True but Nate Cohn did that analysis & showed recall weighting hurts on average but mitigates embarrassing misses. Most pollsters have individual incentive to recall weight to reduce that chance of an embarrassing miss, but overall polling error increases. Negative externalities!
@JustinWolfers Did you read @Nate_Cohn on how weighting recalled vote increases polling error in each past election on average (but reduces error in outlying 2020 polls) & shifts current polls to 2020 results? That's why recall weighting has similar outcomes as herding https://t.co/hm8jQECLBj
@loyaladvisor@EUI_GlobGovProg Oh that's a shame —
I see internet archive has some decent coverage of the e15 site including PDFs, thankfully https://t.co/g59ZsgB09w
📢📢 Call for Papers 📢📢
#ETSG 2024 #Athens 🇬🇷 - September 12-14 - Celebrating the 25th (!) annual conference of the European Trade Study Group.
➡️Conference info: https://t.co/xaQ8las3D0
➡️Submit paper before April 5:
https://t.co/y5BxriIPC8