Japan Defense Brief

🇵🇭🇹🇼🇰🇷🇯🇵🇦🇺🇨🇦🇺🇸 TLDR of the latest in Japan defense news from authoritative local sources.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

The Japan-U.S. command post exercise KEEN EDGE, held in February 2024, explicitly simulated a Chinese invasion of Taiwan for the first time. The exercise evaluated Japan’s response through collective self-defense measures, including JASDF missile attacks on Chinese vessels. Australian participation enhanced the scope of the exercise, which will serve as a reference for future operational planning.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

@SeaLightFound @DefensePitz @ajphelo @Joel_P_Atkinson @supbrow @brentdsadler @bill_hayton @BDHerzinger @cdrsalamander @CollinSLKoh @graham_euan

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

@CollinSLKoh @SeaLightFound Screenshots.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

@FUMIZAWA4 @kyodo_official And this.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

@DXuantian @Unveiled_ChinaX 我可能理解不全面，但从目前公开材料看，财政压力或许是背景因素之一；不过直接证据似乎更支持这是去年以来执法规范化整顿的一部分。若说主要原因是“地方政府没钱裁人”，证据链可能还需要再补强。

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

The asymmetry is hard to ignore. Beijing has long restricted foreign access to key sectors of its own economy while benefiting from broad access to European markets. At the same time, European firms have faced persistent concerns over forced technology transfer, uneven regulatory treatment, and intellectual property theft. The CCP advocates free trade when it serves Chinese interests, but applies heavy state controls and protectionism at home.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

Unfortunately, no.

The good news is that the Google lens OCR function is good enough to scan pages and run character recognition.

AI translation capability have gotten very good too.

The equipment almanac has Janes-level detail. At that price point, this book is a bargain. Great line drawings too!

The policy and orbat book is also fantastic. The JMSDF section will be obsolete b/c of the recent reorganization. Fortunately JMSDF websites are very transparent about order of battles.

Happy to help. :)

If you have other questions, feel free to give me a shout.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

防衛省防衛研究所（@Nids1952）様
採用募集のお知らせに便乗させていただく無礼をお許しください。

在日米陸軍でも現在、中国語を活かせる研究者（技術情報専門職）を公募しております。中国語の読解力が条件の一つとなります。安全保障や研究に関心をお持ちの皆様、よろしければこちらもご参考になさってください。

🔹 中国インフラ・政治部門 [MLC(I)26-134]
https://t.co/3aaQL13FVk

🔹 NASIC部門 [MLC(I)26-117]
https://t.co/HMI8wJd2u0

🔹 中国軍事部門 [MLC(I)26-075-01]
https://t.co/jSHDYld9qz

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

@DoWCTO @CDAODoW @DeptofWar @DOWResponse @CDAODoW @CDAODoW Thank you for this upgrade. If possible, please consider offering Notebook LM. It works better than the conventional RAG and is optimized for rapid learning—necessary for maintaining an agile workforce.

[Luke de Pulford @lukedepulford]

Months before he was appointed National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell was in China, on one of his numerous trips to engage with the Grandview Institution.

The Grandview Institution is *not* a normal think-tank.

Former CIA analyst and President of @JamestownTweets @PLMattis said:

“Grandview is an intelligence-controlled think tank that exchanges the illusion of access for the influence and collection opportunities of elite engagement.”

@ASPI_CTS analyst @BethanyAllenEbr said:

“GVI has remarkable convening power for an unofficial think-tank, arranging meetings for government and military delegations from around the world with senior Chinese government and party officials."

GVI’s links to military and intelligence are “not normal for an unofficial think-tank”, she also said.

In response to this, unnamed Foreign Office officials have gone on record to argue that “you can’t engage China without encountering some CCP officials”.

The fact that engagement with a CCP intelligence front and elite capture vehicle like Grandview is being casually brushed off and categorised as "normal engagement" is a matter for serious concern, and underlines what @CitySamuel argued in today’s @thetimes: the FCDO is culpably, wilfully blind on China.

See the 📸 below for the backgrounds of some of Powell’s interlocutors in Grandview. Just a sample.

Let’s be clear: this is NOT a normal institution. Engaging with them in pursuit of dialogue is a weird kind of cosplay. GVI intends to collect intelligence, entrap and influence. They are not benign think-tankers sincerely interested in exchanging views. If their interlocutors (like Powell) don’t know this, it’s a big problem. If they do, then what’s the point?

Given that Powell is now the National Security Adviser, I think we are entitled to know:

1⃣ What was the nature of the discussions between Powell and GVI?
2⃣ Were any agreements made between Intermediate and GVI?
3⃣ Did any money or sponsorship change hands? Were any of his trips paid for by GVI?
4⃣ What contact, if any, has he had with this group (directly or indirectly) since being appointed to the most sensitive security related role in the UK?
5⃣ Were these meetings minuted?
Has he met with GVI on any of his trips to China while in post?
6⃣ Was his exposure to Chinese intelligence risk-assessed before his appointment, or merely dismissed as “normal engagement” per the FCDO’s risible claim above?

It is noteworthy that Powell is widely rumoured to be heavily engaged in foreign policy decision-making, and has appropriated particular authority regarding China, even prompting FCDO officials to lament privately that he is the “de facto Foreign Secretary”. It is no secret that he pushes for a softer line on China. He was even accused of having a hand in the collapse of the Cash/Berry espionage trial (putatively to save Beijing’s blushes).

We don’t know how much of his current approach has been formed by his engagement with groups like Grandview, but it is certainly a matter of public interest, given the sensitivity of his role.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

@FallonDoune The constitution that you helped forge for Japan is too binding. That will change over time… hopefully soon! Help is on the way. Our prime minister was all for sending minesweepers to assist the U.S. till her cabinet pulled her back.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

[1] Japan Ministry of Defense. “トピックス（2026年3月26日）” [Topics (26 March 2026)]. 26 March 2026. https://t.co/HxFEMHpgCb. Accessed 4 April 2026.
[2] Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF_PAO). X (formerly Twitter) post, March 2026. https://t.co/2HCD6mNwxU

[3] United States Forces Japan (USFJ_J). X (formerly Twitter) post, March 2026. https://t.co/E0qIXKND19

[4] Embassy of the Netherlands in Japan (OrandainJapan). X (formerly Twitter) post, March 2026. https://t.co/lpGFojcroP

[5] Ministry of Defense Japan (ModJapan_jp). X (formerly Twitter) post, March 2026. https://t.co/5lE6i4sN0R

[6] United States Forces Japan (USFJ_J). X (formerly Twitter) post, March 2026. https://t.co/yimlKRkQnP

[7] NTV News. “青森で日米蘭共同訓練” [Japan-U.S.-Netherlands Joint Training in Aomori]. March 2026. https://t.co/CFIM30IHIb. Accessed 4 April 2026.

[10] Japan Air Staff Office. “日米蘭共同訓練（風車ガーディアン）の実施について” [Implementation of Japan-U.S.-Netherlands Joint Exercise (WINDMILL GUARDIAN)]. 3 March 2026. https://t.co/HzwvBe7YEK. Accessed 4 April 2026.
[11] Japan Air Self-Defense Force. “オランダ航空・宇宙軍司令官による訪日について” [Visit to Japan by the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air and Space Force]. 30 March 2026. https://t.co/bthYBJFTXR. Accessed 4 April 2026.

[防衛省 航空自衛隊 @JASDF_PAO]

🇳🇱🇯🇵🇺🇸日米蘭共同訓練・風車（かざぐるま）ガーディアン実施中です。４月３日までの間、日米蘭の３か国で相互理解の深化、部隊の戦術技量の向上に取り組んでまいります。動画は空自ヘリコプターから撮影しました🚁

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

From 20 March to 3 April 2026, Japan, the United States, and the Netherlands conducted WINDMILL GUARDIAN, the first trilateral air exercise of its kind in Japan, integrating 15 F-35A fighters across three nations. The exercise marks a major step in linking Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security through operational airpower cooperation.
https://t.co/7eo0NQHMms

[防衛省 航空自衛隊 @JASDF_PAO]

🇳🇱🇯🇵🇺🇸空自は3月23日から4月3日までの間、オランダ航空・宇宙軍及び米第５空軍のF-35戦闘機等と日米蘭共同訓練・風車ガーディアンを実施しました。

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

Senior Leader Engagements

On 26 March 2026, Lieutenant General André Steur, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air and Space Force, visited Ichigaya Air Base (市ヶ谷基地) and held discussions with JASDF Chief of Staff General Morita Takehiro (森田雄博) [11]. Both sides welcomed the implementation of WINDMILL GUARDIAN and shared expectations regarding the deepening of trilateral understanding and improvement of tactical capabilities [11].

On 27 March 2026, Lt. Gen. Steur and Gen. Morita visited Misawa Air Base and conducted a joint press conference with Lieutenant General Joel Carey, Commander of the U.S. Fifth Air Force (第5空軍) [11]. The three sides shared the recognition that Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are inseparable and confirmed the importance of trilateral cooperation based on the Japan–U.S. Alliance [11].
https://t.co/yimlKRkQnP

[在日米軍司令部(USFJ) @USFJ_J]

日米蘭共同訓練「風車(かざぐるま)ガーディアン」共同記者会見

2026年3月27日、三沢基地にて、米第5空軍司令官キャリー中将🇺🇸、航空自衛隊森田空幕長🇯🇵、オランダ航空宇宙軍司令官ストゥール中将🇳🇱による共同記者会見が行われ、KG26演習の意義と相互運用性・即応態勢強化への取り組みが共有されました

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

Annual Training Outlook: Broadening Global Engagement

The JGSDF also released its FY2026 annual training plan, outlining extensive bilateral and multinational engagements. Key highlights include:

Bilateral Training:
・France (BRUNET TAKAMORI, ブリュネ・タカモリ)
・United Kingdom (VIGILANT ISLES, ヴィジラント・アイルズ)
・India (DHARMA GUARDIAN, ダルマ・ガーディアン)

U.S.-Japan Exercises:
・RIMPAC (リムパック)
・RESOLUTE DRAGON (レゾリュート・ドラゴン)
・NORTH WIND (ノース・ウインド)
・IRON FIST (アイアン・フィスト)

Multinational Exercises:
・JPMRC 26 (JOINT PACIFIC MULTINATIONAL READINESS CENTER 26)
・SOUTHERN JACKAROO (サザン・ジャッカルー) – Australia
・KAMANDAG (カマンダグ) – Philippines
・KHAN QUEST (カーン・クエスト) – Mongolia
・YAMA SAKURA (ヤマサクラ) – Japan
・SUPER GARUDA SHIELD (スーパー・ガルーダ・シールド) – Indonesia
・ORIENT SHIELD (オリエント・シールド) – Japan

Additionally, recurring airborne training using U.S. Air Force aircraft and domestic live-fire exercises—such as surface-to-ship missile (地対艦誘導弾) firing and medium-range surface-to-air missile (０３式中距離地対空誘導弾) training—are planned to sustain readiness.[5]

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (陸上自衛隊). “令和８年度陸上自衛隊主要訓練・演習の年度広報について.” April 3, 2026. hxxps://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/assets/pdf/news/press/2026/20260403_003.pdf.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

On 3 April 2026, the JGSDF announced an expansion of special operations, airborne, and multinational training across the United States, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan—encompassing both recently conducted exercises and the FY2026 annual training lineup—to enhance operational readiness and interoperability with U.S. and partner forces, reinforcing integrated deterrence across the Indo-Pacific; the coordinated release of these activities suggests a deliberate MOD effort to signal a unified, outward-facing training posture rather than a series of discrete events.

[Japan Defense Brief @JpBouei0]

JPMRC 26 in the Philippines: Multinational Readiness in Complex Environments

From 6 April to 20 May 2026, the JGSDF will participate in JPMRC 26 (JOINT PACIFIC MULTINATIONAL READINESS CENTER 26), hosted by U.S. Army Pacific in the Philippines. Training locations include Fort Magsaysay and other sites in Tarlac and Nueva Ecija provinces.

Key participating units include:

・JGSDF: 12th Brigade (第１２旅団), Electronic Warfare Unit (電子作戦隊), Counter-CBRN Medical Unit (対特殊武器衛生隊)
・U.S. Army: 25th Infantry Division and others
・Philippine Army: 7th Infantry Division
・Additional participation: Australian and New Zealand forces integrated under U.S. command

The exercise aims to improve operational effectiveness in “new domain-inclusive environments” while strengthening coordination with allies and regional partners. [4]

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (陸上自衛隊). “令和８年度米陸軍等との実動訓練（ジョイント・パシフィック・マルチナショナル・レディネス・センター２６）の概要について.” April 3, 2026. hxxps://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/assets/pdf/news/press/2026/20260403_004.pdf.