Inst for Science

A think tank focused on nuclear nonproliferation. Employing science in pursuit of peace since 1993. contact us: [email protected]

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

Available Now: The Peddling Peril Index for 2025/2026 - the fifth edition of our in-house ranking of strategic trade control systems - is out! Get your paperback on Amazon here: https://t.co/QVKgc2pjaE Explore the interactive PPI map and get your free PDF here: https://t.co/rYNDfrThrm 

The PPI is a biennial project, using over 100 indicators across five super criteria areas to evaluate national strategic trade controls in 200 countries & entities. The PPI is the product of thousands of hours of work that draws from a collective decades of in-house expertise and an intensive effort to collect, compile, and review information from numerous sources. It remains the only public, comprehensive evaluation of the state of global implementation of export controls and it continues to paint a dire picture.  As in the previous PPI editions, countries could receive a total of 1300 points. Scores ranged from -232 to 1,129, meaning that no country received more than 87 percent of the possible points, and a few countries had very low scores.  Around 50 percent of countries evaluated scored below half of the maximum points in the PPI, with the areas of enforcement and proliferation financing most in need of global improvements. Additionally, over half of all countries lack relevant, comprehensive export control legislation.  

The PPI book contains over 300 pages of in-depth methodology, analysis, recommendations, and applications chapters in addition to the full rankings.  By identifying countries that are both leading and lagging behind in controls, the PPI aims to provide a key starting point for discussions in government, industry, academia, and the NGO community to improve the global implementation of strategic trade controls. 

Curious how your country performed? View its 2025/2026 rank, tier of supply potential, performance cluster, overall score, and subscores, here: https://t.co/rYNDfrThrm

[David Albright @DAVIDHALBRIGHT1]

The U.S. State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to $20 million and possible relocation for information about Iran’s nuclear program. If you have firsthand knowledge of undeclared nuclear facilities, hidden nuclear material, or work related to developing a nuclear weapon, consider coming forward if you can do so safely. Your information could help uncover covert activities and prevent the regime from building nuclear weapons.

Coming forward takes courage. Helping protect Iran and its people from the dangers of the regime’s nuclear weapons efforts is an act of patriotism.

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

Pickaxe Mountain Elevation Profile: Where are the tunnel site’s key features?

We used Google Earth terrain data to derive the elevation profile of the mountain, showing the elevation levels of four key points: the eastern and western primary tunnel entrances, the probable ventilation port/shaft north of the ridge, and the possible ventilation shaft south of the ridge.  We previously reported on the elevation difference between the two pairs of tunnel entrances, which could mean that there are two separate tunnels; the facility has multiple levels; or the western tunnel progresses downwards to meet the other tunnel under the ridge.  In our early 2022 reporting, we considered various options which remain plausible. We newly discuss the elevation of the probable ventilation port/shaft, first identified by the Institute in 2024, and situated north of the mountain ridge, closer to the Eastern tunnel entrances. Interestingly, it sits at the same elevation as the Western entrances, indicating it is able to service either tunnel, both tunnels, or a combined tunnel.  It might also provide an opening for a horizontal tunnel into the western tunnel accessible operations area, i.e., an additional point for ingress and egress, such as for personnel.  It should be noted that it is serviced by electricity,  in addition to the primary eastern and the primary western tunnel portals.  The attached ground photo from 2005 shows its future location on the north side of the mountain.  Note: We confirmed the relative accuracy of the Google Earth elevation profile with high resolution elevation data.

Read the full report here:

https://t.co/kPIU2vQJty

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

IAEA DG Grossi’s summary on the status of Iran’s *declared*  nuclear program is largely aligned with our observations in satellite imagery; post June 2025 there have been some repairs at the Natanz PFEP and the above ground Esfahan facility but we also assessed them to be unlikely for actual reconstruction and more likely for shielding from overhead observation. The key declared sites where enriched uranium storage and/or enrichment took place at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan remain non-operational.  We do have concerns about sites associated with Iran’s UNDECLARED program however, past and present.  DG Grossi does not explain which sites the IAEA is monitoring when referring to "locations associated with [Iran's] past undeclared nuclear programme."  But it should include Taleghan 2, which is actively undergoing reconstruction, and Minzadayi, which sees high levels of activity around the site. The former was part of Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program codenamed Amad and investigated but never visited by the IAEA. The IAEA did find uranium particles at the building next door (Taleghan 1), despite intensive sanitization efforts, that were never adequately explained.  Taleghan 2 was linked to nuclear weapons relevant work as recently as 2024. Minzadayi was targeted by the IDF in March 2026 for its role in Iran’s most recent nuclear weapons capabilities and was linked in public reporting to metallurgy and to the Turquz Abad site, which is part of an ongoing IAEA investigation.  Also not mentioned explicitly by DG Grossi is the status of surviving centrifuges and Pickaxe Mountain, where centrifuges and components were moved according to @WSJ reporting on Israeli intelligence. Together with the enriched uranium, these are critical elements of Iran's nuclear program that could provide Iran a path to reconstitute its capabilities outside of declared facilities.

Quote from DG Grossi today: "As stated in my reports to the Board of Governors, the IAEA continues to monitor activities at Iran’s declared nuclear facilities and locations associated with its past undeclared nuclear programme. Also, and since June 2025, we have not identified any activity to repair or reconstruct any of the facilities damaged in the military attacks of 2025 and 2026."

[Rafael Mariano Grossi @rafaelmgrossi]

Just briefed the @UN Security Council in New York today on current nuclear non-proliferation issues, with a focus on Iran.

Gradual, technical steps could allow @IAEAorg inspectors to return and pave the way to normal safeguards implementation while contributing to a confidence-building atmosphere conducive to a wider agreement.

Only diplomacy, underpinned by IAEA verification, can prevent nuclear proliferation in the long-term, in Iran and around the world.

My full statement to the #UNSC: https://t.co/lO2Qe3S1MX

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

NEW imagery update: Various levels of cleanup activities were observed at the three sites related to Mojdeh / Lavizan 2 following the March 2026 attacks: The main Mojdeh site was previously attacked in June 2025 and was undergoing rapid cleanup efforts, which the follow-on strikes in March 2026 appear to have effectively ended.  After several months of little activity, the attacked, large engineering-type building just north of the main Mojdeh site is currently in the process of being fully dismantled and cleared.  In the process, six containers that were stationed alongside the building before the attack were removed.  The remnants of the destroyed large building cluster at Malek Ashtar University have been fully cleaned up and the space was turned into a large parking lot accommodating the many personnel vehicles on site. See the figures for an overview of the area after the June 2025 war but before the attacks in the March 2026;  the various levels of cleanup activity around the area as of mid-September; and close-ups of the Mojdeh site, the engineering-type building, and the cleaned up area at Malek Ashtar University. 

Read the full report here: https://t.co/Ps1QABU4eQ

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

Pickaxe Mountain Imagery Update:

Vantor Technologies imagery from October 7, 2026, shows that the Eastern tunnel entrances remain blocked by earth. The earthen mound roadblocks leading to the Western tunnel portals also remain in place. See Figures 1 and 2. The two-month-long restricted access reinforces the assessment that the facility is currently neither operational nor continuing major construction. It supports public reporting that the facility contains valuable equipment and/or materials, such as centrifuges and centrifuge components, believed by Israeli intelligence to have been moved into the tunnel facility following the 12-Day War, as reported by the Wall Street Journal in July 2026.

Regarding an attack on the site, a combination of what was done at Natanz and Fordow in June 2025 and at Shahid Boroujerdi in Spring 2026 appears to make the most sense — using a series of bunker busters to target vulnerabilities in the mountain, such as ventilation shafts, coupled with collapsing entrances and destroying utilities and other support infrastructure outside of the tunnel. We have identified both a probable and a possible ventilation shaft location at Pickaxe mountain using satellite imagery. That said, it is possible that the U.S. government decides, based on the information it has on the tunnel site, that the MOAB, which is not a bunker buster but creates the most powerful non-nuclear shockwave, is best to inflict damage on the site. According to CNN reporting this is being considered. While Iran has a lot of experience building military tunnels and commonly adds blast traps by the entrances to prevent shockwaves from traveling down into the facility, these methods are designed to protect against much smaller shockwaves compared to the massive one created by the MOAB. Such an attack could place Pickaxe mountain in the same category that Natanz and Esfahan have been in for more than a year now: Forced, monitored closure, with lack of information about extent of damage inside.

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

Recent @vantortech satellite imagery from October 2026 of the second reconstruction effort at the Taleghan 2 nuclear weapons related R&D facility shows that this effort is progressing rapidly. The facility was first bombed by Israel in October 2024. Despite Iran having expanded and hardened the facility after the first bombing (REF 1), Israel used bunker buster bombs to again attack the facility as well as destroy additional structures around the site (REF 2).  Since March 2026, Iran has repaired the roof covering, most recently adding three concrete pads directly over the penetration holes, possibly to serve as hatchways or vents. Whatever their function, associated construction activity was concealed by temporary tarp coverings in September (REF 3). Other work included reinforcing the structure with two stepped concrete side walls, and completing a new hardened entrance way that was damaged in the last bombing. This effort has been an intensive undertaking by Iran to reconstruct the facility, but when it could become operational is unclear. The reasoning why Iran is reconstructing a well known and well characterized facility is perplexing, but, at a minimum, it shows that Iran wants to reestablish its lost capabilities there. Below are several images showing the current state of construction since the facility was destroyed by an airstrike in March 2026. 

REF 1: https://t.co/I6TMkFnvvK
REF 2: https://t.co/jLeqHsFHRf
REF 3: https://t.co/0j4sJwBMlB

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

Over the last few months, we have seen high levels of activity at certain nuclear weaponization sites pointing to reconstruction efforts specifically at Taleghan 2 (starting in June 2026), notable vehicle activity at Minzadayi (September/October 2026) and significant cleanup including the removal of containers at Mojdeh / Malek Ashtar University (August/September 2026).  Hardly any activity has been observed at known sites tied to uranium enrichment where the main entrances remain destroyed / blocked by earthen materials and on which the media and public at large tend to focus: Pickaxe Mountain (as of October 7), the Natanz Nuclear Complex (as of October 7), Fordow (as of October 11), and Esfahan (October 12).

[Barak Ravid @BarakRavid]

🇮🇱🇺🇸🇮🇷Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump last week discussed the possibility of launching a new operation against Iran before the Israeli and U.S. elections, according to two U.S. officials, one Israeli official and a fourth source with knowledge of the matter.
🇮🇱🇺🇸🇮🇷The Israeli leader's call with Trump about the possible attack took place before Trump said he would not strike Iran ahead of the midterms
🇮🇱🇺🇸🇮🇷Netanyahu said during the call that he was concerned about Israeli intelligence indicating Iran was taking troubling steps to reconstitute its nuclear program, according to an Israeli official

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

In addition to the earlier reported high levels of vehicle activity, we noticed the repair of a probable water tank and the addition of a new, small building nearby in the northern part of the Minzadayi site.  This again points to Iran's efforts to not just clean up the site, which was attacked by Israel in March 2026 for its nuclear weapons connection, but to resume regular activities. See our earlier report here:  https://t.co/SXt9waDSER

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

NEW Report: Significant Activity Identified at Minzadayi, an Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development Site

High resolution @vantortech satellite imagery from September and October 2026 shows significant renewed activity at Minzadayi, a nuclear weapons development compound northeast of Tehran revealed by Israel during the 2026 war.  The compound was attacked by Israel on March 3rd, 2026, destroying several buildings and likely underground structures. The recent satellite imagery indicates a return to regular vehicle activity around the site post extensive cleanup operation that included the clearing of rubble and debris and repair of damage on the hillside.  One area attacked in March 2026 shows ongoing earth moving activity.  The earth moving activity is occurring at a surface made to look like a courtyard where multiple craters could be seen following the attacks on the site in March 2026. Significant vehicle presence can be seen throughout the site between early September and early October 2026. Cars are parked outside the security perimeter in the parking lot, and many passenger vehicles and trucks can be seen inside the perimeter.  Given what is known about this compound, this activity may be indicative of an effort by Iran to reestablish a nuclear weapons development capability and to reconstitute what was lost in the attack on the compound.  

Based on public reporting and statements released by the IDF, the nuclear weapons work carried out here likely involved research and development on nuclear warheads.  The IDF originally stated, that a “group of nuclear scientists operated covertly to develop a key component in the nuclear weapons system,” adding that “the complex is designed to enable the restoration of the required technology and the advancement of capabilities for the development of nuclear weapons.”

@IntelliTimes, released additional information on the compound.  In a post from September 24, 2026, it states that the nuclear weapons related infrastructure was established in 2022 and “absorbed part of the means from the nuclear warehouse,” a common reference to the Turquz Abad site revealed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in September 2018.  Netanyahu revealed the site following Iran’s removal of more than a dozen shipping containers from the site that were assessed to hold nuclear material and equipment relevant to Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities.[4]  When the IAEA visited Turquz Abad in March 2019, it found evidence that nuclear material or contaminated equipment had been present at the site and the IAEA Board has since been pressing Iran to answer the IAEA’s questions about the current whereabouts of said material and/or equipment. @IntelliTimes indicates Iran did not simply move the material and/or equipment to a new long term storage site but used the new site in northeast Tehran, aka Minzadayi, to establish an”  industrial nuclear headquarters for the reconstruction of research, development, and adaptation infrastructure for nuclear warheads,” including the means to “produce cores of enriched uranium and the explosive material required to cast into them the detonation chain.”[5]  The current renewed effort underway at this highly secure compound suggests that the work being conducted here is of top priority.

Read the report here: https://t.co/SXt9waDSER

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

Podcast on the latest developments on Iran with @DAVIDHALBRIGHT1 👇

[The Telegraph @Telegraph]

On today's episode of Iran: the Latest, @venetiarainey looks at apparent growing momentum towards a deal as world leaders from across the Middle East gather in New York.

After Trump vowed once again to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, former nuclear weapons inspector @DAVIDHALBRIGHT1 breaks down how Tehran is using the lull in fighting to rebuild and fortify key capabilities at Parchin and Pickaxe Mountain.

Listen to Iran The Latest via the link below ⤵️

https://t.co/Sa0wHJH4Iq

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

A close review of @vantortech satellite imagery from September 11 and 19, 2026, has revealed cables strung between defensive towers constructed at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone surrounding the Shahed/Geran production facilities. The cables strung between towers serve as a passive defense against incoming cruise missiles or long-range strike drones seeking to target the drone production facilities. Drones or cruise missiles will strike the cables, causing them to detonate in the air instead of striking the production facilities directly or force aircraft to come in high and make them more vulnerable to anti aircraft defenses.  More towers are still being constructed. 

The Iraqis used this same tactic to protect Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center during the Iran/Iraq war up until the 1981 bombing of the Osirak reactor by Israel. 

The Institute first identified these passive defensive towers in our last update, which can be read here: https://t.co/xIEDiaUrli 

Alabuga is also working hard to construct new facilities just south of the main production complex, identified by Dnipro Osint (https://t.co/ZCc2kMutIi). The facilities cover a large area, consisting of half a dozen or more buildings, with more actively under construction.  This would constitute a large expansion of the Alabuga Special Economic Zone. Some of the buildings are in the process of being buried under multiple layers of dirt and reinforced concrete in order to harden them from potential attacks.

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

Trump's statement on not seeing a lot of activity at Pickaxe mountain is fully in line with our satellite imagery observations. Access to all four tunnel entrances has been severely restricted since the beginning of August. Iran apparently figured better to block the entrances voluntarily than have them blocked by force. The last several weeks show virtually no movement of equipment and little vehicle movement.  Pickaxe Mtn effectively joined the list of nuclear related sites that are not currently operational, not easily accessible, and where resumption of activity would be easily detected. Media outlets and other reporting that recently highlighted high activity at Pickaxe Mountain should also take note of this significant slowdown.

[Iran International English @IranIntl_En]

US President Donald Trump said Washington could strike Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain nuclear site if it detects renewed activity there.
“We may have to blow up another one, Pickaxe Mountain. We’re not seeing a lot of activity there, but if we do, we’ll blow it up immediately,” he said during a meeting with GCC leaders in New York.

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

New Imagery Update: Iran is Rapidly Reconstructing Taleghan 2

@vantortech satellite imagery from September 13, 2026, shows that Iran is rapidly moving forward with the reconstruction of the Taleghan 2 facility located at the Parchin military complex.  Iran has erected a tarp above the destroyed hardened buried facility, hiding the reconstruction activity that is occurring underneath from satellite view or aerial reconnaissance.  Significant activity can be seen throughout the construction site.  Construction vehicles, including dump trucks, bulldozers, concrete pump trucks and concrete mixers, and cranes, are actively working to rebuild the facility.  Repair and rehabilitation work began in June 2026, first with Iran repairing and placing concrete caps over the penetration holes caused by the multiple bunker buster weapons dropped on the facility.  Iran has also built a new concrete apron reinforcement on the right side of the facility, the one on the left side that we noted in our July 2026 update now appears complete.  This will provide additional blast protection from an aerial attack. 

Link to our full report here: https://t.co/0j4sJwBMlB

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

Update on passive defense measures at the nearby Natanz Nuclear Complex: we noticed in an August 21, 2026, image by @vantortech the presence of several passive defensive structures.  Throughout 2026, Iran placed makeshift dirt mounds in several locations at the above ground complex, in key areas that could be used by U.S. or Israeli forces to land vertical takeoff or landing (VTOL) aircraft. Chicane barriers made from dirt can also be seen placed along the road just outside of the security perimeter. These passive defense structures are likely intended to complicate any sort of ground forces raid conducted against the complex.

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

Update on passive defense measures at Pickaxe Mountain: @vantortech imagery from September 11, 2026, shows that the earthen mound roadblocks are still in place, blocking ground vehicle access to the Western tunnel portals. The week-long restricted access reinforces the assessment that the facility is not currently used for operations, but that it does contain valuable equipment and/or materials. The clearly visible roadblocks mean a return to regular access and activity at the Western tunnel entrances should easily be detected by U.S. intelligence and visible on commercially available imagery. Together with the previously blocked Eastern tunnel entrances, the new roadblocks effectively established a status quo inside the facility starting in early August. 

Earthen mounds were also placed over one western tunnel portal and over a nearby cluster of portals first built in 2007 that have been expanded and rebuilt in recent years. The added soil increases overburden and helps harden the entrances against aerial bombardment.

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

@GeraldC_Brown @NonproJoe The question is why? They cite media left and right but cannot link to our reports or our X page?

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

The recent CSIS report on Pickaxe mountain missed an important finding in the August 2026 image that contradicts one of its central conclusions. And the lack of citation to our work borders on the comical.

The report by Joseph Rodgers @NonproJoe and Douglas Comstock states that activity at Pickaxe Mountain has “shifted from active excavation toward probable internal construction and continued exterior reinforcement.” That may be true and we pointed out both for more than a year.

But the contradiction is that their image shows, apparently without noticing it, that Iran has more recently moved to limit access to all entrances to the tunnel facility as if the site is preparing against attack. The authors appear to have missed the multiple new earthen piles blocking the road leading to the main western tunnel portal and one pile blocking the road to the auxiliary western portal. Given that the eastern tunnel portals were already partially backfilled in April 2026, this severely limits ground access to the site.

The CSIS report has a serious lack of citation. Readers will be surprised to see that there is not a single direct reference to any ISIS report on the facility, which we have been monitoring since 2020 when construction began. But there is a link to a X post that reposted one of our key findings from a report. We asked for citations to be added last week but have not heard back.

Some examples which should be cited so the reader can understand the publication chronology and public analytical record include the identification of the security perimeter; the hardening of tunnel portal entrances; the blocking of the eastern tunnel portal entrances; the hardening and burial of the nearby 2007 tunnel complex; the operational status of the facility; start of internal construction; identification of potential vulnerabilities; and the possible purposes of the facility. See table below.

We have a much deeper analysis of the lack of citation in this and earlier CSIS reports which we hope is not necessary to publish. Claiming that they did not know about our published reports or use any of our published reports to produce their report would lead to a more serious charge than we are currently making.

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

@GeraldC_Brown @NonproJoe They do not "specifically reference" any of our reports and that is our issue.

[Inst for Science @TheGoodISIS]

NEW: Report on August 2026 Russian drone launches reveals new trends, namely dramatic increases of daylight attacks and the use of jet powered drones.  

According to @anokhin_i estimates, based on Ukrainian Air Force reporting and supplementary monitoring data, Russia used at least 5,166 Shahed-type UAVs, including decoys.  Of these, an estimated 4,288 UAVs were shot down or suppressed. 

August 2026 marked a transition from the more concentrated overnight pattern observed earlier in the year toward sustained day-and-night pressure.

Newly, up to 57 to 62 percent of Shahed/Geran drones launched are assessed as jet-powered, compared to just about 10 percent in June.  

Faster jet-powered UAVs compress engagement windows for mobile fire groups and many interceptor drones, forcing reliance on faster and more expensive defensive systems.

For sanctions and export-control analysis, the central question is whether Russia can sustain this transition. Turbojet engines, flight-control electronics, anti-jamming, inertial navigation, communications hardware, components, materials, and production equipment remain priorities. Chinese substitution, remaining Western dependencies, intermediaries, and sanctions-evasion routes require continued investigation.

We’d like to note that since July, the analysis of monthly drone launches has become increasingly difficult because the Ukrainian Air Force is publishing progressively less detailed daily information. In particular, daytime UAV attacks are now often substantial, but separate daytime totals are not always reported; the Air Force no longer regularly states how many of the total UAVs were specifically Shahed/Geran; and, beginning in August, it also increasingly stopped reporting the number of UAV hits, instead giving only the number of affected locations. We would urge the @KpsZSU to return to its original format of reporting and define specific timeframes for daytime and night time launch reporting.  

See the key graphics below and read the full report here: https://t.co/WPArzaGEX3