Some preliminary thoughts on the relationship between Iran’s nuclear program (the “nuclear crisis”) and the Israel-Hamas war and related dynamics (the “regional crisis”). 🧵
It would be too much of a stretch to say the current war is unfolding under the “nuclear shadow”…1/
This is not an “open” Strait by any reasonable definition of the term, and almost certainly not what the Trump administration envisioned as the outcome of the MoU. Remember: The primary argument for the MoU—made by advocates and even critics—was that it was necessary to open the crucial waterway. That hasn’t happened.
At least three, possibly as many as 5 ships struck in the strait. Traffic is continuing but has gone dark, ships switching off AIS.
Hard to see how US can let this stand--reckon some kind of kinetic response is coming.
This was good: @BrewerEricM on Iran’s threshold nuclear status and deterrence strategies, in conversation with @nktpnd on @warontherocks’s Thinking the Unthinkable podcast. https://t.co/DYvVNrtipb
The reason Trump was forced to go back to diplomacy is because there is no military solution to Iran’s nuclear program. If he could have eliminated it militarily, he would have already done so. More bombing won’t change this reality.
Always enjoy discussing nukes with @nktpnd for his Thinking the Unthinkable podcast with @WarOnTheRocks. Last week I sat down with him to dive into my latest article in the @TXNatSecReview, which examines how Iran tried and failed to leverage its nuclear threshold status as a deterrent in the 2023-2025 conflict. We also touched on some current events as well.
https://t.co/hqpRWhKQp8
I’m not sure that strategy has been totally useless, but certainly when put to the test, ultimately failed to provide any measure of deterrence.
https://t.co/Uz8Fenxv3s
Iran had its opportunity to develop a bomb since the mid 90s.
This entire "we're going to flirt with the idea of it but not actually build one" has been the biggest disaster for the country since the Mongol invasion.
You either build it or don't, but the middle ground is the worst of all worlds
In latest, we explore the world of the indefinite interim Iran deal and the prospect of an endless post-war ahead amid narrow odds of a final comprehensive nuclear deal.
With @DavidSCloud, @benoitfaucon.
https://t.co/cUQC3qT7Vp
That’s. Not. What. The. MoU. Says.
I wish it did, but it doesn’t.
“The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, whether retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly.”
🚨 US Official to @Jerusalem_Post on the report the 3 Billion dollars of Iranian funds will be unfrozen: “No frozen funds have been released and no frozen funds will be released unless Iran meets the requirements outlined in the MOU. As the MOU outlines, the United States must approve how the funds are used. If Iranian assets are released, they will be used to purchase American agricultural products from American farmers to feed the Iranian people.”
NEW: Trump is actively weighing a return to all-out war with Iran, discussing the possibility with senior officials like Hegseth and Caine—but he is sticking with diplomacy for now.
The conversations have centered around what some officials call “finishing the job.”
IMO and Oman lining up behind the Hormuz "tip," with quiet support from the rest of the Gulf, might be enough to persuade the US to accept it.
Question is: would a scheme like this be enough to satisfy Iran?
People have lost sight of a fundamental elemental fact.
The United States has given Iran oil sanctions relief.
Iran has not sat down with U.S. for talks for days. And says the next ones will be back to indirect talks.
These are the facts.
This is an awful idea. We need more nuclear energy, and that means a laser focus on deploying technologies that are safe and affordable. The last thing we need is to cut regulations for costly and dangerous distractions like reprocessing.
My latest for @meforum examines whether #Iran can legally impose tolls on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Despite comparisons with the Turkish Straits and other maritime chokepoints, international law does not support Tehran's proposal. #OOTT
https://t.co/y1XyKImU0W
If it hasn’t been settled in the MOU what sanctions relief and other economic incentives Iran will get and what Iranian actions they are tied to (if any) that is a BIG deal and could easily result in weeks of additional negotiations if it doesn’t collapse the MOU outright.
"The head of the US technical team and his Iranian counterpart will meet separately with the Qatari and Pakistani mediators."
Indirect technical talks won't lead to a detailed nuclear agreement. 20% of the way through the supposed 60-day period and the negotiators are still playing telephone https://t.co/GwoRtg3PwD
At this point, I have little confidence in assessing whether anything has been released. Do we have any administration official on the record saying definitively one way or the other? All I’ve seen is something along the lines that Iran won’t get any sanctions relief up front and it will be a “pay for performance” model. Which is vague, and belied by the oil/petrochemical waivers. Whether it changes the broader landscape depends on amounts, what it’s in exchange for, and plans for future releases.
There’s been several reports over the past couple of weeks alleging frozen funds have been made available to Iran. And now we have this comment from Pezeshkian. If Congress (and the administration) cared about upholding the law, we’d be having hearings on the MoU, and this could all be resolved with simple questions on whether the United States has helped make available such funds and what if any restrictions are placed on their use.
For all the analysis arguing Iran has immense leverage and is taking the US to the cleaners, seems somewhat notable that the first (fairly small) tranche of frozen funds has yet to be released.
Most of the 60 day period has been spent trying to reconcile competing interpretations of the MoU rather than making progress toward a final deal—a pattern that looks set to continue. For Iran, this is partly by design. If talks are focused on the Strait, then they aren’t focused on the nuclear program.
👇Agreed. They're leaning pretty hard on this vague "side deal" concept without saying what's involved. So, we have to go with what we see, which ain't much.