Halvor Kippe

Principal Scientist, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), specializing in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Views are my own. PDGA#8929

[Pix🔎 @PixBuilds]

How To Tell If Your Girlfriend Is A Spy:

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Will Iran Becoming the Next North Korea? How a War Intended to Prevent a Nuclear Iran May Have Made It More Likely

The greatest strategic failure of the war with Iran may not be what the United States and Israel failed to destroy. It may be what they destroyed politically and strategically in the process.

For anyone whose primary objective was to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, this war may ultimately prove disastrous.

The war may have simultaneously undermined the three main instruments for preventing a nuclear Iran: deterrence, diplomacy, and internal restraint within the Iranian leadership:

First, the war eliminated a leader who had long resisted the development of nuclear weapons. Ali Khamenei was certainly responsible for advancing Iran's nuclear capabilities, but he also maintained a longstanding position against actually producing nuclear weapons after 2003. Whether that position reflected religious convictions, strategic calculations, or both, it represented an important constraint on Iran's nuclear decision-making.

His killing removed that constraint without eliminating Iran's nuclear knowledge, technological capabilities, or strategic motivations. His successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, is not necessarily bound by the same calculations. More importantly, the new leadership has experienced something its predecessor spent decades trying to avoid: a direct, devastating war with the United States and Israel.

Second, the war exposed the limitations of American military deterrence.

For years, Washington and Jerusalem relied on the threat of military action to discourage Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. As long as that threat remained theoretical, Tehran had to consider the possibility that pursuing nuclear weapons would trigger an overwhelming American response. Once the United States actually attacked, the calculation changed.

The war demonstrated America's extraordinary ability to destroy Iranian infrastructure. But it also demonstrated that military superiority does not necessarily translate into strategic victory. Iran did not surrender. Its political system survived. Its nuclear ambitions were not necessarily eliminated. And Washington discovered that even overwhelming military power could not guarantee the political outcome it wanted.

The threat of military force was once a powerful instrument of uncertainty. After the war, Tehran has a much clearer understanding of both American capabilities and their limitations.

Third, the war strengthened the strategic argument for acquiring nuclear weapons. This may be the most damaging consequence of all.

For years, opponents of nuclear weaponization within Iran could argue that crossing the nuclear threshold would invite a devastating American or Israeli attack. But that attack has now happened, despite Iran not possessing nuclear weapons.

The argument that nuclear restraint protects Iran from war has therefore become considerably harder to sustain. Those advocating a nuclear deterrent can now point to the destruction inflicted on Iran and argue that conventional capabilities, regional proxies, and nuclear ambiguity were insufficient to prevent an attack. Their conclusion could be straightforward: Iran needs a nuclear deterrent not to start a war, but to prevent another one.

That does not mean Tehran has already decided to build nuclear weapons. But it means the internal strategic argument in favor of doing so may be stronger than at any previous point. The increasingly explicit public statements by senior Iranian regime officials about the need to develop nuclear weapons only reinforce this assessment.

Fourth, the war has made a comprehensive nuclear agreement much more difficult and expensive. Before the war, negotiations could focus primarily on enrichment, sanctions relief, inspections, and verification. Today, any serious agreement must also address the consequences of the war itself.

Iran is unlikely to agree to major nuclear concessions without meaningful guarantees against renewed military attacks, access to frozen funds, the ability to export oil, and an acceptable arrangement regarding the Strait of Hormuz.

And this is where the strategic paradox becomes particularly striking. The United States may now have to make substantial concessions on Hormuz simply to create the conditions for negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. In other words, Washington could find itself sacrificing leverage over the Strait of Hormuz to preserve the possibility of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran.

Even then, there is no guarantee of success. The level of distrust is unprecedented, and Tehran has every reason to question whether any American commitment would survive another change of administration.

Fifth, the midterm elections demonstrated that Iran possesses a powerful means of deterring future American military action without nuclear weapons.

The disruption of global energy markets and the economic consequences of the war have imposed substantial political costs on the Trump administration. From Tehran's perspective, the Democratic victory provides evidence that Iran can influence Washington's strategic calculations by making a prolonged confrontation economically and politically unsustainable.

This is an important lesson for every future American president. The United States can inflict enormous destruction on Iran. But Iran can also impose costs on the American economy and the global energy system that Washington may find politically unacceptable.

Imagine how much more complicated this calculation would become if Iran also possessed nuclear weapons.

And this brings us to North Korea.

In 1994, the Clinton administration seriously considered military action against North Korea's nuclear facilities. But Washington understood that even a successful strike could trigger a devastating war on the Korean Peninsula.

The administration ultimately chose diplomacy and reached an agreement that temporarily froze important elements of North Korea's nuclear program.

That agreement eventually collapsed, and North Korea went on to acquire nuclear weapons.

The lesson is not that Iran and North Korea are identical. They are not. The lesson is that a state capable of imposing unacceptable costs on the United States can severely constrain Washington's military options, even when America enjoys overwhelming conventional superiority.

Iran has now demonstrated that it can impose such costs through its geographic position, its ability to disrupt energy markets, and its capacity for regional retaliation.

If Tehran eventually adds nuclear weapons to that equation, the American dilemma will become even more severe. The United States could find itself facing the same fundamental choice it has confronted with North Korea: tolerate a nuclear-armed adversary and rely on deterrence and containment, or attempt to eliminate its nuclear capabilities through a war whose consequences could be catastrophic.

And here lies the ultimate irony. A war launched in part to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons may have removed a leader who opposed weaponization, weakened the credibility of military deterrence, strengthened the arguments of Iranian nuclear hardliners, made diplomacy more expensive, and demonstrated the enormous political costs of another military confrontation.

The war did not make an Iranian nuclear bomb inevitable. There are still significant technical, political, and strategic obstacles, and Tehran may ultimately choose not to cross the threshold. But it may have made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons more attractive to those responsible for Iran's national security.

We may eventually discover that the most damaging consequence of the war was not that it failed to eliminate Iran's nuclear threat, but that it helped convince Tehran that nuclear weapons are the only reliable guarantee against another war.

That would be a devastating outcome for a military campaign intended to prevent precisely that scenario.

#Iran
#IranWar‌
#NorthKorea

[Anshuman Narang @anshu217]

Another ICBM test probably by China PLARF. Information by Kalec on SDF

NOTAM -
A5720/26 NOTAMNQ)ZXXX/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/3854N10938E013A)ZBPE ZLHW B)2611050223 C)2611050245 E) A TEMPORARY DANGER AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N390000E1095100-N385000E1094800-N384800E1092600-N385800E1092700- N390600E1093300,VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.CIVIL ACFT ARE FORBIDDEN TO FLY INTO THE AREA.F)SFC G)UNL

A5722/26 NOTAMNQ)ZXXX/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/3909N10835E019A)ZBPE ZLHW B)2611050224 C)2611050246 E) A TEMPORARY DANGER AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N392000E1081500-N391100E1090000-N385800E1085600-N390600E1081100,VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.CIVIL ACFT ARE FORBIDDEN TO FLY INTO THE AREA.F)SFC G)UNL

A5724/26 NOTAMNQ)ZLHW/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/4002N10301E040A)ZLHW B)2611050225 C)2611050248 E) A TEMPORARY DANGER AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N401900E1021500-N400500E1035300-N394600E1034800-N400000E1021000,VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.CIVIL ACFT ARE FORBIDDEN TO FLY INTO THE AREA.F)SFC G)UNL

A5726/26 NOTAMNQ)ZLHW/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/4039N09736E039A)ZLHW B)2611050226 C)2611050249 E) A TEMPORARY DANGER AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N405400E0964800-N404400E0982700-N402500E0982400-N403500E0964500,VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.CIVIL ACFT ARE FORBIDDEN TO FLY INTO THE AREA.F)SFC G)UNL

A5721/26 NOTAMNQ)ZXXX/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/3854N10938E013A)ZBPE ZLHW B)2611050830 C)2611050852 E) A TEMPORARY DANGER AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N390000E1095100-N385000E1094800-N384800E1092600-N385800E1092700- N390600E1093300,VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.CIVIL ACFT ARE FORBIDDEN TO FLY INTO THE AREA.F)SFC G)UNL

A5723/26 NOTAMNQ)ZXXX/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/3909N10835E019A)ZBPE ZLHW B)2611050831 C)2611050853 E) A TEMPORARY DANGER AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N392000E1081500-N391100E1090000-N385800E1085600-N390600E1081100,VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.CIVIL ACFT ARE FORBIDDEN TO FLY INTO THE AREA.F)SFC G)UNL

A5725/26 NOTAMNQ)ZLHW/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/4002N10301E040A)ZLHW B)2611050832 C)2611050855 E) A TEMPORARY DANGER AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N401900E1021500-N400500E1035300-N394600E1034800-N400000E1021000,VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.CIVIL ACFT ARE FORBIDDEN TO FLY INTO THE AREA.F)SFC G)UNL

A5727/26 NOTAMNQ)ZLHW/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/4039N09736E039A)ZLHW B)2611050833 C)2611050856 E) A TEMPORARY DANGER AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N405400E0964800-N404400E0982700-N402500E0982400-N403500E0964500,VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.CIVIL ACFT ARE FORBIDDEN TO FLY INTO THE AREA.F)SFC G)UNL

[Military History Now @MilHistNow]

The 1983 movie 'War Games' opens with a chilling scene showing the crew in a U.S. missile silo receiving orders to carry out a nuclear launch.

[notamatron.app @notamatron]

Possible Russian missile test over the White Sea, 5–10 Nov, 07:00–16:00Z daily. Two closures share one schedule, and a 40 km wide strip ends inside a box to the north-east. No purpose stated, low confidence. https://t.co/9CPT4YSzkr

[Outer Space Today @outerspacetoday]

JUST IN: The Pentagon has published a remarkable image of China's secretive Shenlong spaceplane in orbit, captured by a Maxar satellite and featured in its newly released 2026 space threat assessment.

The reusable, uncrewed spacecraft launches aboard a rocket and returns to Earth on a runway, similar to the U.S. military's X-37B.

China has conducted four orbital missions since 2020, demonstrating the ability to deploy and maneuver near other objects in space.

The DIA warns that technologies used for satellite inspection and proximity operations could also support anti-satellite capabilities.

China has disclosed few details about the spacecraft's missions or capabilities.

[Babak Vahdad @BabakVahdad]

An interesting editorial in Kayhan makes an explicit case for reconsidering Iran’s nuclear doctrine, linking nuclear deterrence directly to the assassination of Ali Khamenei.

- The newspaper argues that nuclear weapons do not necessarily prevent conventional wars, but can deter escalation when a state’s survival or territorial integrity is at stake. It cites Russia, Pakistan and North Korea as examples.

- Most significantly, Kayhan argues that had Iran possessed nuclear weapons, its Supreme Leader would not have been targeted and assassinated.

- The editorial concludes that revising Iran’s nuclear doctrine and strengthening its deterrence capabilities could help protect both the survival of the Islamic Republic and the country’s territorial integrity.

- This remains an editorial position, not an official policy decision. Nevertheless, it is another indication of how the debate over nuclear deterrence is evolving within Iran’s conservative establishment.

#Iran

[COMSPOC_OPS @COMSPOC_OPS]

COSMOS 2612 (SSC.68762) walks up to ICEYE-X36 (SSC.59103)

In July we posted on the Cosmos 2609–2614 group. Back then we flagged COSMOS 2612 as the satellite best placed to reach ICEYE-X36. Three months later, it did.

Analysis via COMSPOC SSA.

On 1 October COSMOS 2612 raised its orbit ~47 km. The higher orbit gave it a fast catch-up drift, and it passed ICEYE-X36 at ~55 km on 5 October and again on 12 October. Within about two hours of the second pass it made two retrograde burns (~27 m/s total) and dropped back to ICEYE-X36’s altitude, ~515 km behind it. Between 13 and 16 October seven small burns (~5 m/s total) closed that gap.

By 16 October COSMOS 2612 was in ICEYE-X36’s plane (within 0.003°) and at its altitude. Since the two share a plane, there are no plane crossings to wait for. From 16–18 October they spent ~24 hours within 2 km of each other and ~12 hours within 1 km. First pass was ~220 m (max uncertainty ~490 m) near 14:03 UTC on 16 October. It then held 2–4 km behind before drawing level on 17 October and settling into a centred safety ellipse around ICEYE-X36, which it held for the rest of the day. Closest pass in our solution was ~60 m (max uncertainty ~950 m) near 14:18 UTC. By late on 17 October it had drifted ~2 km ahead, then trimmed back for a third pass at ~260 m (max uncertainty ~160 m) near 01:58 UTC on 18 October. Relative speed at the closest points was 0.15–0.9 m/s, walking pace or slower. Slow walk-past, not a fly-by . ICEYE-X36 did not maneuver.

COSMOS 2612 burned away at 12:30 UTC on 18 October, braked on 19 October, and is now holding ~480 km from ICEYE-X36 in the same orbit.

We’ve seen this sequence before. COSMOS 2581, 2582 and 2583 (SSC.62902/62903/62904) have been running it against each other since February 2025: raise, phase, drop to co-altitude, close at under half a meter per second, hold, depart, loiter. Since August 2025 we’ve logged more than 170 sub-km conjunction events within that trio, several down to single-digit meters. Until now, every target had been one of their own. This is the first non-cooperative one.

@planet4589
@shell_jim
@IntegrityISR
@ObservableSpace

[Trita Parsi @tparsi]

Things are looking very bad. Between Trump's coordination with Netanyahu - his bizarre endorsement of the Israeli war criminal and Heghseth's surprise visit there - troop movements, and perhaps most importantly, a non-starter American proposal, the likelihood of a third round of the war is reaching 90% in my assessment.

As I have pointed out for weeks, Trump pretends the Strait is open and wants to exchange the lifting of the blockade for Iran's 60% HEU instead of a reopening of the Strait.

It's understandable he wants a final deal right away. But it is unrealistic to expect a final deal without final-deal American compromises. As I understand it, Trump is not willing to offer that upfront, but wants Iran's 60% HEU shipped out upfront.

This won't work and will likely lead to a third round of the war - before the midterms and possibly before Israel's elections on the 27th.

More here: https://t.co/jR1fGCUi1w

[Eric Brewer @BrewerEricM]

A few thoughts on this FT article about growing calls for the bomb in Iran.

1. This was entirely predictable (and predicted). The U.S. and Israel made an attempt at regime change—an existential war for Iran—and are arguably still gunning for regime collapse. Between that, and killing the person who was likely one of the main impediments to the bomb (Ali Khamenei), it’s not hard to see why arguments for nuclear weapons are gaining steam.

2. But it’s not just the nature of the current war. It’s the failure of Iran’s prior nuclear strategy, which held that having an ability to produce nuclear weapons—vice the bomb itself—could provide an adequate deterrent to major strategic attacks. That failure was arguably there in 2024, and made patently obvious following the 2025 strikes and 2026 war. With that failure, it’s perfectly logical for Iran to undertake some searching for alternatives. An obvious one is actually building nuclear weapons.

3. But let’s be honest: The decision to build nuclear weapons isn’t going to be made by popular vote. That decision, if it occurs, will be made by a very small number of officials. So we should be careful about using this public discourse as an indicator of a near term decision to develop the bomb. That said, growing popularity for nuclear weapons can provide a degree of political top cover for any decision. That public discussion can also strengthen the hand of weapons advocates internally. But at the end of the day, this is an insider game.

https://t.co/V9QkHzEvPC

[Taepodong @stoa1984]

Nice article aknowleging that "16Ga" is a provisional designation while giving a comprehensive overview.

Indeed curious when 16Na will conduct first *claimed* operational launch.

[Kate from Kharkiv @BohuslavskaKate]

Just so you understand the scale of betrayal: first, our "partners" didn't warn Ukraine about the incoming ballistic missiles, so the air raid alert wasn't activated before impact, robbing people of their chance to survive.

​Then, Starlink was restricted to stop working at speeds above 100 mph. This renders useless, first and foremost, our interceptor drones. It doesn't limit our ability to attack inside Russia, it limits our ability to stop another apartment building or school full of civilians from being hit.

​Wow, just wow.

[Nicole Grajewski @NicoleGrajewski]

“The Houthis shipped in from a Chinese supplier a range of components needed to make a version of one of Iran’s most powerful weapons, the Kheibar Shekan Iranian precision-guided missile, said the report by Conflict Armament Research” @laurnorman @benoitfaucon

[つぶやきNORTH KOREA @nk9655]

昨日ミサイル総局が、日本海で２種類の潜水艦発射戦略巡航ミサイルの試験発射。金正恩は不参加。水中戦闘システムの動員態勢チェック、戦略的任務遂行能力の熟練が目的で、戦争抑止手段の高い信頼性・能力を見せることに寄与。（朝鮮中央通信）

#北朝鮮
#ミサイル

[Sam Lair @sam_lair]

What is the state of Iranian missile production sites? Thanks to new imagery from our friends at Planet Labs, the @FPRI IDAC Team took a look!

Bottom line, many of the facilities are still severely damaged, with some debris removal and repair work ongoing.

Link below:

[Conflict Armament Research @conflictarm]

New 📢 from CAR: Houthi Ballistic Missile Manufacturing

Read CAR's latest Field Dispatch from its Yemen investigations: https://t.co/MMup9dHFk1

[Fabian Hinz @fab_hinz]

New CAR report: The Houthis are attempting to manufacture medium-range ballistic missiles of the Khaibarshekan-series in Yemen.
https://t.co/6EGHpyUkwC

[Halvor Kippe @halvorkippe]

@stoa1984 A valid argument (the timing), not least because there is some precedent (discoball and peanut). But useful to keep the caveat, I think. Not least whenever people argue that there needs to be another full-scale test eventually because of the Hwasan-31.

[Halvor Kippe @halvorkippe]

@stoa1984 Are you sure the Hwasan-31 is not based on something already tested? It's a very common perception, but I haven't seen any convincing arguments why it has to be so.

[朝鮮人民軍bot @KPA_bot]

四枚目の奥に新型のMRAP。Roshel Senatorのような、今までの朝鮮にはないタイプのシャープな見た目