Rached

[Rached @REM1453]

Since the start of the war, I have been relatively skeptical that Iran's targeting of US intelligence and military "sensitive" locations is done by satellite. Satellite is one piece of the puzzle. It is anti-US human networks that are the real star, and US is downplaying that.

[Egypt's Intel Observer @EGYOSINT]

‼️ Iran's IRGC thanked "the people and armed forces of Jordan," claiming they provided intelligence that helped Iranian forces accurately target U.S. military positions with ballistic missiles.

The IRGC claimed the strikes destroyed 20 hangars at Azraq Air Base and killed dozens of U.S. troops.

[zispoms @imzispoms]

Argentina play with such a level of thuggery that their baseline for a yellow is higher than nearly every team in the tournament. almost every tackle they're jumping onto the other man lmfao

[fan @NoodleHairCR7]

This is what happens when you reach a World Cup final with rigging

[Katie Goldin 🐜 @KatieGoldin]

“In this social media campaign we would like you to focus on Haley Stevens authenticity. Please phrase in your own words.”

[Esfandyar Batmanghelidj @yarbatman]

It’s funny to read a criticism about the “poverty of analysis” about Iran that reflexively refers to the “mullahs in Tehran” making decisions.

There is a single Islamic jurist (Ejei) on Iran’s 12-person Supreme National Security Council!

The actual issue in Iran analysis today is that people in senior roles at major institutions (1) fail to update their knowledge of Iran as the country evolves, (2) fail to engage alternative viewpoints with intellectual curiosity, (3) refuse to enter into collegial and respectful debate, opting instead to throw around accusations like “regime supporter.”

Jonathan, if you have to append a disclaimer at the end of a post, it’s probably because that post is discrediting to you and your employer and will be read as such. And yet!

[Dr Andreas Krieg @andreas_krieg]

It looks like Qatar is keeping partners in the Gulf closely engaged in Doha's quiet mediation attempts between the US and Iran amid vertical escalation

[Jack 🇵🇸 @jacktymac]

Haley Stevens: "Israel is something that Abdul wants to make this race about, and it’s an important issue to him.'"

Meanwhile, also Haley Stevens:

[Curt Mills @CurtMills]

Unfathomable setup and kicker here https://t.co/Pn1pF12ia6

[Rached @REM1453]

Iran announced a "long war" strategy from the beginning.
Flattening the curve of escalation is ideal.
Sustained degradation of US regional position and mounting economic crisis for the world while weathering limited US military and economic pressure.
Its leverage will only grow.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

Another indication that #Iran still does not want to escalate to the point of no return - unless it is pushed to that point.

Yet whenever I argue that Tehran is operating under strategic constraints that make it unwilling to go all in -unlike during the 40-day war - some self-proclaimed "experts" on this platform immediately push back and offer all sorts of alternative explanations, while largely ignoring the broader logic behind Iran's behavior.

[Bruno Maçães @MacaesBruno]

How does the Economist always get it wrong? Defies the laws of statistics

[Rached @REM1453]

@adamjohnsonCHI Maybe... Mamdani is extremely popular with the Dems who already believe Netanyahu is evil, but this also pushes the conversation towards "he has no right to visit our country", brings up what can be done to spoil the visit, centers conversation on his criminality when he does etc

[Rached @REM1453]

👀

[Mahdi Kharratiyan @MehdiKharratya]

جالب شد، اینکه بنده تا آخرین لحظات ما قبل جنگ در جهت تعامل با جریانهای انزواگرای حزب جمهوریخواه و رسیدن به صلح برای ایران تلاش کرده ام جرم است، اما اینکه امثال قاسمی نژاد به عنوان عامل لابی اسراییل و نئوکانهای حزب کل یوم در حال تلاش برای جنگ علیه ایران و نابودی زیرساختها و کشتار غیرنظامیان بوده و هست، اقدامی مثبت و موجه است. خیانت و خباثت جریان پهلویست-صهیونیست به تمامیت ارضی و منافع ملی ایران، نه فقط در تاریخ ایران بلکه در تاریخ جهان به عنوان نمونه بارز "وطن فروشی سازمان یافته" ثبت خواهد شد.

[Hammam Farah @HumHum83]

I searched a Gaza war crimes archive for my family.

I quickly realized I wasn’t using it the way most people would. I wasn’t browsing it as an activist, researcher or journalist.

I was looking for my family.

My heart sank as I filtered the archive by the dates we lost them and searched for someone I loved.

I found footage I hadn’t seen before of the bombing of the Church of St. Porphyrius, where my cousin Soliman was killed.

I searched for the day my great aunt Elham was murdered, and the day Nahida and Samar Anton were killed by Israeli snipers at the Holy Family Catholic Church.

Eyewitnesses told us Elham was crushed by an Israeli tank. I have graphic photographs of her body that were sent to me by church workers in Gaza, but I found no footage of what happened.

It made me wonder how many people died without leaving behind any visual record.

The realization stayed with me.

Here was a digital graveyard where pieces of my own family history are preserved for journalists, historians, truth seekers and, undoubtedly, those seeking to exploit or consume human suffering.

I know I won’t be the only person to experience this. Other Palestinians searching for loved ones almost certainly will too. But it struck me that this is a form of grief that could scarcely have existed before our time.

It’s a form of grief I never imagined could exist.

[Rached @REM1453]

@bonzerbarry

[barry with the NED @bonzerbarry]

Wow, Trump hasn’t posted for 17 hours

[Rached @REM1453]

None of these actors had any keverage to compel the US to stick to what they all worked so hard to produce - the MOU. Worse than that, the US was hoping that bringing all these US-allied mediators in will force Iran to soften its blows.

[Babak Vahdad @BabakVahdad]

My take on the regional diplomatic landscape.

- One of the most striking features of the current phase of the Iran-US confrontation is not only the daily exchange of strikes, but also the relative absence of the regional diplomacy that proved so important only a few weeks ago.

- During the previous crisis, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt-the so-called Islamabad Quartet (STEP)-worked through different channels, with Qatar and Oman also playing important roles, creating the conditions that eventually led to the ceasefire and the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. Today, that diplomatic momentum appears much weaker.

- Pakistan, which had emerged as perhaps the most effective intermediary between Washington and Tehran, now finds itself operating in a much narrower diplomatic space. Islamabad has developed pragmatic and constructive relations with Iran over the years, shaped by geography, shared security concerns and the presence of a large Shiite community representing around one-fifth of Pakistan's population. At the same time, Pakistan remains deeply connected to the Persian Gulf monarchies through decades of political, economic and military cooperation. Its security partnership with Saudi Arabia-including a long-standing mutual defence framework-remains one of the pillars of its regional policy, while reports have recently suggested discussions on a similar arrangement with Kuwait.

- As long as Tehran and the Persian Gulf monarchies manage their differences, Pakistan can effectively and successfully balance these relationships. But the more direct the confrontation becomes, the narrower Islamabad's diplomatic room for manoeuvre. The renewed Houthi-Saudi escalation, combined with growing tensions around Bab al-Mandab, makes that balancing act increasingly delicate. Pakistan is not stepping away from diplomacy; it is being forced to navigate between two strategic relationships that have both become more difficult to manage simultaneously.

- Saudi Arabia itself is once again focused on its own security concerns, while Qatar also finds itself in a much more difficult position. Doha was previously one of the few actors able to speak credibly with both Washington and Tehran. Today, however, it has become directly exposed because of the Iranian strikes. A mediator inevitably loses room for manoeuvre once it becomes part of the battlefield.

- At the same time, Iranian security-linked media have become increasingly critical of Erdogan and Turkey’s regional posture, openly portraying Ankara as a strategic rival. This does not necessarily signal a rupture, but it does suggest that the political cohesion which characterised the Islamabad Quartet during the previous round of diplomacy has weakened.

- Egypt, which was the first country to promote the regional diplomatic initiative that later evolved into the Islamabad Quartet, bringing Saudi Arabia into the process with Washington’s encouragement, now appears increasingly isolated. Cairo remains committed to diplomacy, but it no longer seems to enjoy the same regional alignment that made the previous initiative possible.

- This, perhaps, is the main difference from the previous crisis. Regional diplomacy has not disappeared, but each of its key actors is now constrained by a different strategic dilemma. Pakistan is trying to preserve its balancing role between Iran and the Persian Gulf monarchies. Saudi Arabia is preoccupied with Yemen. Qatar is directly exposed. Relations between Iran and Turkey have become more strained. The result is a fragmented diplomatic landscape precisely when a coordinated regional effort is needed the most.

- The key question is therefore not only whether Washington and Tehran can eventually return to negotiations, but whether the regional diplomatic architecture that made the last de-escalation possible can be rebuilt. Without that convergence, another ceasefire will be considerably harder to achieve.

#Iran

[Rached @REM1453]

This really underestimates the leverage that these Shia networks garner Iran. In Iraq, where Saddam once reigned, the benefit is obvious. In Lebanon, they are a clear sap on Israel.
And they act as a counter balance to America's Sunni allies.
The true failure was in Syria.

[Arta Moeini PhD @ArtaMoeini]

I'm of the view that the "resistance axis" & "forward defense" are poor substitutes for actual deterrence that Iran can possess and exercise from Iranian soil. In fact, in many cases, they've made Iran entangled abroad and more vulnerable. Best case, they are Iran's allies and could be useful in specific episodes (like if the Houthis ever shut Bab al-Mandab)

But the Islamic Republic's insistence to include these forces as the cornerstone of its grand strategy stems more from IRGC's institutional interests and ideological inheritance than Iran's national interest and geopolitical calculus.

Facing existential threats, Iran has little choice but to shed the wishful thinking and instead develop real relative and absolute forms of deterrence like Israel has that it can fully control, and that would prevent sustained military attacks against it.

[Trita Parsi @tparsi]

Told @kthalps that if Trump's calculation is to return to talks after degrading Iran's ability to close the Strait, this may be a miscalculation because Tehran isnt likely to return to serious talks at Trump's convenience. Rather, Iran will likely drag it out to maximize political damage to Trump.

https://t.co/uE765A1PuH

[Rached @REM1453]

Except Iran has spent decades under strategic containment and Israel has literally been allowed to get away with even genocide with full aid from the G7.

[Dr Andreas Krieg @andreas_krieg]

One interesting similarity between Iran and Israel in terms of their strategic culture is the belief that they are surrounded by enemies they cannot trust, the idea of having been victimised by the world and that therefore resistance and fighting is the only way forward

[Rached @REM1453]

@danshallman @dylanotes There is zero reason to respond to a question and then ask it be taken down. "Reckless?" Oh no, won't someone think about the legal reputation of Netanyahu's army in Washington.