kluo

nobody.

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@David_Ornstein @TheAthleticFC Better tell me no more than 50 mils pounds

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@ClaudeDevs Can you do that on the cli?

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@0xConda Good joke on Wednesday Brandon 😂

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@OpenAI How can I get it?

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@Surendar__05 Codex for sure, claude has so many refusals even you are in the CVP

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@itsvishaltwt Grok 4.5 is the best

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@grok Do you have cyber program for security researchers to apply to lower your guard rail for Supergrok?

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@onehopeA9 @grok translate to English

[Eyad @eyad_khrais]

https://t.co/i5L6UIPgH8

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@NahamSec ��

[Ben Sadeghipour @NahamSec]

🚨 Giveaway + Update:
We just updated my Hands-on Web Exploitation Course with a new Client-Side Path Traversal module which includes new labs and an hour of video content. I have create a code to give you 60% off (limited to 15 people only). https://t.co/IYKDeLHTUV

Retweet and respond with a 🎉 to enter. Winners will be announced on January 2.

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@piyascode9 Agent

[Branko @brankopetric00]

A penetration tester got root access to our Kubernetes cluster in 15 minutes. Here's what they exploited.

The attack chain:
- Found exposed Kubernetes dashboard (our bad)
- Dashboard had view-only service account (we thought this was safe)
- Service account could list secrets across all namespaces
- Found AWS credentials in a secret
- Used AWS credentials to access EC2 instance profile
- Instance profile had full Kubernetes admin via IAM
- Used kubectl to create privileged pod
- Escaped to node
- Root access to entire cluster

What we thought we did right:
- Dashboard was read-only
- Secrets were encrypted at rest
- Network policies were in place
- Regular security updates

What we missed:
- Dashboard shouldn't be exposed at all
- Service accounts need principle of least privilege
- Secrets shouldn't contain AWS credentials (use IRSA instead)
- Pod Security Policies weren't enforced
- Node access wasn't hardened

The fix took 2 weeks:
- Removed Kubernetes dashboard entirely
- Implemented IRSA for all pod AWS access
- Applied strict PSPs/Pod Security Standards
- Audit all RBAC permissions
- Regular penetration testing

Cost: $24K for the pentest
Value: Prevented what could have been a catastrophic breach

[S3cur3Th1sSh1t @ShitSecure]

Raw NTFS parsing for SAM/SYSTEM/NTDS.dit access?

https://t.co/EerQ3lFxlA

400 lines Powershell - easy peasy ❤️🔥

[Andrea P @decoder_it]

Blog post about my recent CVE-2025-58726, aka “The Ghost Reflection” is out, read it here:
https://t.co/KnuLXeNLUc
🙃

[elvis @omarsar0]

Great recap of security risks associated with LLM-based agents.

The literature keeps growing, but these are key papers worth reading.

Analysis of 150+ papers finds that there is a shift from monolithic to planner-executor and multi-agent architectures.

Multi-agent security is a widely underexplored space for devs.

Issues range from LLM-to-LLM prompt infection, spoofing, trust delegation, and collusion.

[Dirk-jan @_dirkjan]

If you want to know how to bring your own IDP in Entra, and abuse OIDC protocols for persistence, my x33fcon talk is now on YouTube ��

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@rez0__ I saw me coding today.
Using cursor
Using windsurf
Using chatGPT compared answer with Grok and deepseek.
I just sat there. Eye ball the results
Like a psychopath

[kluo @mr_kluo]

@albinowax Cant wait for your write-up / talk on the exploit chain

[Qrious Secure @qriousec]

A brief JavascriptCore RCE story by @lanleft_ and An Nguyễn

https://t.co/mKJMcmVZGS